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Athletes are not quite like ordinary citizens.  ‘Ordinary’ laws and moral principles apply to 
athletes as much (or as little) as anyone else – but athletes are subject to another set of 
considerations just because they seek to enter the co-operative enterprise of competing with and 
against others in sporting contests.  As ‘contractors to contest’, they must accept certain 
constraints in order to count as acceptable opponents.   
 
One such putative constraint is that against doping in sport. Much has been written on the theory, 
facts and morality of doping, and on the justification for banning it. In Britain, the chief sources 
of study and comment seem to have been Grayson 1999, Waddington 2000, Houlihan 2002, and 
articles from the Journal of Philosophy of Sport, including those collected in Morgan & Meier 
1988, and from collections edited by Tamburrini & Tännsjö, 2000 and 2005.  
 
This essay is an attempt to explore the issue of doping in sport via applied ethics, showing how 
complicated and messy individual cases can be, and how our judgements about them are 
coloured by a range of moral possibilities and intersecting contextual features.  Sometimes the 
sheer weight of competing considerations, together with the uncertainty of empirical 
determinations, overwhelms our ability to arrive at conclusions acceptable even to ourselves – 
sometimes there just aren’t any clear-cut answers. 
 
The paper, then, will address issues of the relation between theory, empirical evidence, 
background scientific assumptions, the ethics of sports and sports rules, and the context-
dependence of our judgements. It will do so via an examination of four recent cases involving 
British athletes, Alain Baxter (skiing), Dwain Chambers (athletics), Rio Ferdinand (football) and 
Greg Rusedski (tennis).  These cases present us with very different though overlapping features, 
which open up a wide range of issues for consideration.  It will explore the adequacy and 
morality of the actions of the athletes and their support teams, and of certain rules, procedures, 
decisions, and judgements surrounding these cases.  The outcome will be assessments of the 
relative innocence and guilt of each athlete in respect of a variety of factors. 
 
In order to set the scene for our four cases, let me very briefly address some of the central 
questions. 
 
Why do athletes take drugs? 
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There are many reasons given for taking drugs, which refer to the supposed benefits of doping: 
 
? Enhanced performance (direct and indirect) 
? Decreased recovery period, allowing more intensive training 
? Masking the presence of other drugs 
? Making the weight 
? Staying the course (simple endurance - e.g. long-distance cycling) 
? Psychological edge (promoting the athlete’s confidence) 
? Keeping up with the competition (coercion - pressure to follow suit) 
 
Why do we think it is wrong to take drugs? 
 
1.  Pre-competition agreements 
 
The primary wrong lies in simple rule-breaking. The rules function as a kind of pre-competition 
agreement which specifies an athlete’s eligibility to compete and his rights, duties and 
responsibilities under the agreed rules.  What’s wrong with doping is the secretive attempt to 
evade or subvert such a ‘contract to contest’, an explicit example of which is the Olympic Oath, 
by which athletes swear that they have prepared themselves ethically, and will keep to the rules. 
To subvert the contract to contest threatens the moral basis of sport, jeopardises the integrity of 
the sporting community and erodes public support and trust. 
 
However, the rules themselves require a basis of justification, since the anti-doping rules must 
appeal to some issue of principle in addition to rule adherence. Considerations advanced include 
the following: 
 
2.  Unfair Advantage 
 
Arguments against performance enhancement through doping are not simply arguments against 
performance enhancement, since that is what athletes constantly seek to achieve by training, 
coaching, nutrition, the application of sports science, etc. Neither is the argument simply against 
performance enhancement by means which confer an unfair advantage, since many legal means 
are beyond the resources of most countries. Rather, the argument is specifically against unfair 
advantage conferred by illegal means. 
 
3.  Harm 
 
Many argue that doping may be harmful, because the substances are inherently harmful, or 
because they have been administered without medical supervision, or because they have been 
inadequately tested. Further, it is argued that harm to other athletes is caused by the coercion 
they feel to follow suit in order to maintain competitiveness. 
 
4.  Social Harm 
 
With the huge expansion in the market for drugs in gyms and fitness clubs, there is now an 
emerging claim for a further wrong: that, by modelling dope as a lifestyle, athletes contribute to 
the social problem of thousands of sport, fitness and bodybuilding fans consuming substances 
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whose long-term effects are unknown. Athletes, it is said, should be more aware of their social 
responsibility.  
 
Why do we ban doping? 
 
It is one thing to say that doping is wrong, and quite another to ban it, which requires the 
apparatus of testing, judicial procedure and enforcement. So alongside such principles we see 
various rationales for testing and enforcement, including: 
 
? Fairness Preservation (against unfair advantage) 
? Athlete Protection (against harm to health and reputation) 
? Retribution and punishment. 
? Deterrence via detection. 
? Lifestyle prescription 
? The ‘role model’ requirement 
 
But there are also two kinds of arguments against a ban. The first is ‘empirical’, suggesting that 
we cannot test effectively and fairly, because: 
 
? there is inadequate coverage (not enough resources for testing and testers, or not enough 
support from civil authorities) 
? the tests not good enough (one test for EPO had only 92% accuracy, and the cycling 
federations were afraid to have their decisions tested in court, since they could have been 
ruined by one court action) 
? athletes with the best knowledge and resources know how to avoid detection, which is why 
the testing procedures catch so few (there is a suspicion that, out of the relatively few cases 
of detection, there is a relatively large proportion of cases where the athlete was convicted of 
some very minor infraction, or on a technicality, or for a non-performance enhancing 
substance, or where there is a reasonable doubt that the athlete did anything wrong at all) 
? there are many cases which seem to be simple mistakes 
 
The second kind of argument is ‘moral’, suggesting that we should not ban on grounds of 
infringement of liberty and should not test on grounds of invasion of privacy. This kind of 
argument would also point to the many cases of injustice in the history of testing and 
enforcement, and to the tyranny of value and lifestyle prescription. 
 
Why isn’t it just down to individual choice? 
 
Some argue that a ban is simply parentalist - that we cannot justify interference in the individual 
athlete’s decision-making processes. Tamburrini, for example, says: 
 
… the ban on performance-enhancing methods constrains the professional activities of 
athletes, and … the reasons often advanced to support that constraint do not stand 
criticism (Tamburrini, 2000, p. 215) 
 
However, Schneider (2005, pp. 88-89 in draft) argues that the ‘individualistic’ view fails to give 
adequate recognition to the private/public distinction. It seems to suppose that any individual’s 
‘private’ views and decisions (such as to engage in doping, or to seek performance-enhancing 
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genetic technology) are privileged, and should be taken into account by any existing institutions 
(such as sports practices). Schneider objects that such private views should not be allowed to 
‘trump’ the values expressed in and through the practice - that there is a ‘public’ view here that 
should take precedence. 
 
In this she is surely right - there has to be, as a minimum, a debate between the representatives of 
the practice and intending reformers. Individual reformers cannot simply expect that those who 
defend the cherished values of an established practice will (or should have to) accede to 
individuals’ private views as to what will benefit the practice. Why should people who want 
‘clean’ sport have to accept dopers? 
 
The history of sports development is littered with examples of reformers, dissenters and break-
away factions who founded new versions of a sport, or even new sports, which seems to suggest 
that some established practices were successful in ‘defending’ themselves against incursion. 
Some have suggested that this is the way forward for dopers: they should announce themselves 
as dopers, and set up their own versions of various sports. But this won’t solve our problem, 
because there is no guarantee that some dopers won’t refuse to identify themselves as such, since 
they presently only succeed in their plans if they’re secretive. Just as at present, there is no 
guarantee that any individual would deny himself the advantage of pretending to be clean whilst 
secretly doping.  If he doesn’t respect the anti-doping rules now, why should he respect the 
clean/doped distinction later?  
 
So I accept, with Schneider, that sports practices are not ‘private’, and need not be constrained to 
take account of everyone’s private preferences. They are communal practices, and encapsulate 
certain shared views, adherence to which is a prerequisite of entry and participation. Of course, 
rules change - sometimes as a result of pressure from within the practice, and sometimes from 
without - but only (in some sense) with the consent of the practice. 
 
However, to call them ‘public’ practices overstates the case, since it suggests that the sports 
practices themselves are (or should be) sovereign, against private interests. This ignores the fact 
that they exist within and cannot (or on occasion should not be allowed to) remain isolated from 
wider society, which may legitimately take a view on the desirability of allowing a certain sports 
practice, or a certain activity within a sports practice. For example, in the UK, duelling and bare-
fist boxing are illegal; and within rugby certain bodily assaults have become actionable. 
 
So, instead of simply the public and the private realms, we must draw a distinction between the 
private realm, the practice realm and the public realm, which permits us to recognise that there 
may be issues which highlight the relationship between the practice realm and the public realm. 
There may need to be a conversation between views arising within and representing the sports 
practice, and views reflecting changing and developing attitudes in wider society - for example 
on such matters as the use of drugs and body technologies. Public attitudes have changed 
dramatically in recent years, and this can be expected to have some impact on sports practices. 
 
 
The Ethical Basis of the Idea of Sport 
 
Let me comment upon a positive feature of the debate about performance-enhancing drugs.  The 
drugs debate has forced everyone to think in ethical terms, and to appeal to ethical principles.  
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But if we take these appeals seriously, and follow them through, there are some interesting 
consequences.  Assume that drug-taking in sport is wrong, and ask the question: 'why is it 
wrong?'  The answers we have given above were all stated in terms of some ethical principle that 
is claimed to be central to our idea of sport, which drug-taking allegedly violates.  Let us revisit 
two of those arguments and see where the underlying principles lead us: 
 
1. Unfair Advantage or Inequality of Opportunity 
 
Some say that what is wrong with drug-taking is that it confers an unfair advantage.  Notice that 
no-one can (sincerely) make this objection to drug-taking unless he is sincere in his commitment 
to sport as embodying fairness, and as disallowing unfair advantages as being against the idea of 
sport. 
 
However, many of those who hold this objection against drug-taking seem perfectly prepared to 
allow various kinds of very obviously unfair advantages. For example, only certain countries are 
able to generate and enjoy the fruits of developments in sports science; and only certain countries 
are able to take advantage of the knowledge and technology required for the production of 
specialised technical equipment. Is this fair? The company that produced the so-called 'moon-
bikes' for the US cycling team in the 1984 Olympic Games later shamelessly marketed them 
under the slogan:  'The Unfair Advantage'. 
 
Let's widen the issue: it seems to me a fact that international competition is grossly unfair, 
because some countries have the resources to enhance the performance of their athletes, and 
some don't. Those nurtured within advanced systems might take time to consider the extent to 
which their performances are a function not just of their abilities as individual sportspeople but 
also of the social context within which they have been nurtured. Have not their performances 
been enhanced? Are not their advantages unfair? 
 
Consistency requires that we revisit the whole idea of disadvantage, and also inequality. For 
example, why not include more ‘ethnic’ sports in the Olympic programme, rather than 
continuing the present Western hegemonic domination? Kabbadi, a sport popular on the Indian 
sub-continent, is a sport based on the game form of ‘tag’, which is known in most societies in the 
world. It requires minimal facilities and no equipment. Why should we westerners not have to 
learn such sports and compete on those terms, rather than collude in the disappearance of 
indigenous sport forms in favour of our own curriculum? 
 
Anyone who relies on ‘unfair advantage’ arguments in the case of doping must also revisit and 
reconsider such arguments in other contexts. 
 
2. Rule-Breaking, or Cheating 
 
Others say that drug-taking is wrong simply because it is against the rules of competition.  But 
pace-making is against the rules of the IAAF, although it is allowed so as to facilitate record-
breaking attempts in the commercial promotion of media spectacle, and no-one is disqualified. In 
fact, runners can earn large fees for performing this 'service'. If officials so readily flout their 
own rules, they are poorly placed when athletes do the same, or when critics demand better 
justification for the rules that presently exist. 
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In a world where the values of sport are sometimes forgotten under the pressures of medal-
winning and the marketplace, it ill behoves those responsible to turn a moralistic eye on athletes. 
Why should athletes take any notice of the moral exhortation of those who have profited from 
the commercialisation of sport, when they see the true values lived and expressed by those 
around them? 
 
The drugs debate has made everyone stand on ethical principle. But think how sport might 
develop (what it might become) if those principles were not merely used opportunistically over 
the drugs issue, but rather were acted upon consistently in the interests of truly fair competition 
and equality of opportunity. I think that there is an opportunity here to open up debate again 
about the ethical basis of sport, so that our sports practice (and the sports science and training 
theory that support it) becomes rooted in firm principles that encapsulate what we think sport 
should be. 
 
 
A Thought Experiment 
 
1. The Harmless Enhancer 
 
Imagine that, along with my colleague Leo Hsu, I have succeeded in producing a pill whose 
entirely natural ingredients are derived from herbs to be found only in a remote part of Taiwan, 
and so far unknown to Western medical science.  The ingredients have been used in traditional 
medicine for 3000 years without harmful effects, but our new (and secret) applications have 
revealed hitherto unsuspected (and remarkable) performance-enhancing effects.  Are there any 
reasons why we should not use it? 
 
This imaginary scenario ‘takes out’ a certain kind of medical critic, whose complaints are mainly 
related to harms - actual or supposed, demonstrable or alleged. This scenario ex hypothesi 
requires us to imagine a substance which is (a) proven to have no harmful effects and which is 
(b) a proven performance-enhancer:  and it asks us to consider the question “What, if anything, 
could be wrong with taking a harmless enhancer?” 
 
2. The Undetectable Enhancer 
 
Imagine further that such a pill is completely undetectable in use. This imaginary scenario ‘takes 
out’ the intrusive and (let’s not forget it) enriched pharmacologists - for their role has been both 
to develop performance-enhancing drugs and also to develop ways of detecting them! This 
scenario ex hypothesi requires us to imagine a substance which is (a) in principle undetectable in 
use and which is (b) a proven performance-enhancer:  and it asks us to consider the question 
“What, if anything, could be wrong with taking an undetectable enhancer?” 
 
Responses 
 
My main answer is that, despite the fact that they were harmless and undetectable, it would be 
wrong to take these enhancers if they were banned, because it is simple rule-breaking.  If anyone 
seeks to evade any rule for advantage, especially when they do it knowingly and secretively, then 
that is the clearest possible case of cheating. True, there may well be arguments outstanding 
regarding the justice, relevance or importance of the rule itself;  but so long as the rule is the rule 
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we ought all to obey it, on pain of sanction. To get into the Ritz, men must wear ties. Whether or 
not this is a stupid or trivial requirement is irrelevant to whether I get into the Ritz. There are 
plenty of places to eat, but if I want to eat at the Ritz, I had better wear a tie. 
 
Sports competitors prepare and compete on certain more or less precise understandings described 
by the rules. Any attempt to evade these rules for advantage is cheating. It is an attempt to 
subvert the very basis upon which alone the activity is possible; it is to pervert the logical and 
moral basis of the whole social practice of sport. This is the greatest harm perpetrated by doping 
cheats: not the alleged medical harm to self or the coercion of others, but the harm to self and 
others caused by behaviour which threatens the social practice of sport itself. 
 
 
Now we must turn to a detailed consideration of our cases, where we shall see some of these 
features, reasons, principles and arguments in application. We shall also be able to assess each 
case against the notion of secretive evasion of rules for advantage, and to ask whether the 
behaviour exhibited threatened the social practice of sport. 
 
 
ALAIN BAXTER 
 
The Case 
 
Before his slalom competition on the last day of the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, 
the Scottish skier Alain Baxter took the American version of a Vicks nasal spray decongestant 
which, unlike the British version, contained lev-methamphetamine. As a result of his positive test 
he was denied the only skiing medal ever won by a Briton in the history of the Olympic Games. 
He appealed to the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), which heard the case at the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City in October 2002 
and which cleared him of intending to cheat. However, his result was not reinstated, nor his 
bronze medal. 
 
Principles 
 
1.  Strict liability 
 
Strict liability is the legal principle that identifies fault and assigns liability regardless of 
circumstances. A landlord must not allow his premises to be used for drug trafficking.  If his 
tenants traffick, he is liable, regardless of whether he colluded in it or profited by it, or whether 
he was even aware of it. Claiming ignorance or stupidity is no excuse. 
 
Another example from sport is that of Romanian gymnast Andrea Raducan, who had a gold 
medal withheld at the Sydney 2000 Olympics after testing positive for pseudo-ephedrine, having 
taken two Neurofen tablets for a headache under the supervision of team doctor Oana Ioachim, 
and having entered this on the requisite declaration form. 
 
We can see why we need such a principle as strict liability. It denies an excuse to those who 
should have taken more of an interest, or who should have taken more care. Its justification must 
be that, without it, many guilty defendants would escape serious charges, e.g. of corporate 
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negligence or drug smuggling. Without it, almost anyone could offer an excuse – to allow people 
to claim lack of intent, ignorance or stupidity would open the floodgates. 
 
In sport, the argument is that even if an athlete unknowingly took a doping substance, or took it 
without any intent to gain an advantage, other athletes should still be protected from any 
advantage he might have gained (see the comments of Flint et al, 2003, on the CAS 
adjudication). 
 
But strict liability can sometimes produce what seem to be very harsh and unjust outcomes for 
some individuals in particular cases.  Many unwitting drug mules languish in jails as a result of 
having drugs planted on them by people they thought were friends - because ignorance or lack of 
intent are no excuse. 
 
The same applies to Baxter. The facts are not altogether clear, but some versions say that he 
failed to take medical advice, presumably because he was confident of the contents of the spray, 
the British version of which he used frequently without concern. He said that he had been bought 
an inhaler that was not his usual brand by his brother, which he did declare to doctors. But then, 
  
“I saw the inhaler I wanted to buy in the first place because I have been using it since I 
was a kid. At the time it never crossed my mind it was different to the British one. In my 
mind I had no reason to get it checked.” (Davies, 2002b) 
 
However, it seems that the American version of the Vicks spray is “clearly marked on the 
American  anti-doping website’s list as one to avoid” (Davies 2002a), so that if Baxter had 
thought to check, the information was available. Thus it could be said that Baxter’s fault (if any) 
lay in his failure to take steps that were open to him in order to protect himself, such as 
submitting all of his medications to medical authority, and double-checking substances for 
himself - but this in itself shows the lengths to which athletes must now go to avoid prosecution. 
 
Craig Reedie, British Olympic Association chairman and IOC member, commented: 
 
“The BOA is very disappointed with the decision reached by the IOC. We take the view 
that Alain has suffered a dreadful penalty. 
“No way can Alain be described as a ‘drugs cheat’.” (Davies, 2002b) 
 
The main rationale for testing is commonly supposed to be fairness preservation (against unfair 
advantage). However, Baxter and Raducan are both considered to have gained no advantage at 
all, and yet they have been punished by the denial of their just reward. How can this be justified? 
Only if we assert the primacy and overwhelming importance of the principle of strict liability in 
fairness preservation, and the instrumental use of these athletes in the service of deterrence. 
 
2.  Restorative Medication 
 
This raises the issue of whether (and, if so, when and how) we can distinguish the performance-
enhancing and the ‘restorative’ (or ‘compensatory’) usage of drugs - the issue of dope versus 
medication. 
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In one sense, all restorative/compensatory usage is also performance-enhancing. It enables me to 
perform to the best of my ability on the day, despite the fact that I have, say, a headache or a 
cold. But let us distinguish this sense (as ‘restoring’ my performance to its optimal) from that of 
an ‘additional’ enhancement. 
 
The problem is that it is difficult to determine the threshold according to which am I restored, 
and above which my restoration in fact tipples over into a possible additional advantage. If a 
decongestant ‘opens my pipes’ when I have a congesting cold, won’t it also open them a little 
more than usual when I’m perfectly healthy, thus conferring an advantage? 
 
One example of the effect of this difficulty is that of Rex Williams, then President of the World 
Snooker and Billiards Association, who was banned in 1977 for using beta-blockers, which he 
was using on medical prescription for a heart condition. That is to say, he needed the beta-
blockers in order to be ‘normal’. In effect, the, the doping regulations made it impossible for him 
to compete on equal terms with others, presumably because an additional benefit could not be 
ruled out. 
 
Such cases have led to the development by WADA of an International Standard for Therapeutic 
Use Exemptions (TUE), which sets out the criteria for the granting of a TUE, which must be 
applied for no less than 21 days in advance of an event, and must involve no additional 
enhancement of performance, the absence of a reasonable therapeutic alternative and evidence of 
significant need. (See WADA website). 
 
3.  The science of the substances 
 
Often, the science of the particular substances involved goes unchallenged or unexplored, when 
the whole case rests upon dubious science. In Baxter’s case, for example, we should note that 
there are two varieties of methamphetamine. The ‘lev-methamphetamine’ variety found in 
Baxter’s sample (and used in some nasal decongestants) is commonly thought to have no 
performance-enhancing properties, and the manufacturer, Proctor and Gamble, sent a statement 
to this effect to the CAS. However, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) does not 
distinguish that from the ‘dextro-methamphetamine’ variety, a stimulant known also as ‘speed’, 
which may enhance performance by improving reaction times. The IOC bans both, and Baxter’s 
test would not have distinguished between them (see Cairns, 2002, pp. 121-2). 
 
In the case of Raducan, IOC President Jacques Rogge publicly conceded that her use of the drug 
was not performance enhancing, but nevertheless supported the punishment, saying “the rules are 
the rules.” And it is clear that the IOC does not have to prove the performance-enhancing 
qualities of a particular drug in a particular case (see Flint et al, 2003, p. 955). All that the CAS 
has to do is to apply the IOC rules that ban certain substances. 
 
But the cases of Baxter and Raducan make it clear that there is a huge responsibility on the 
shoulders of those who compile the list of banned substances, for there is a massive gap between 
the propositions: 
? substance X has performance-enhancing qualities 
? substance X was found in Y’s body 
? Y’s performance was enhanced 
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4.  The science of minute quantities 
 
Many athletes have been detected with the tiniest quantities of banned substances, where the 
tiniest quantities are enough to convict.  Is this fair?  One view says that testers can’t know that 
tiny traces come from tiny doses - for they might be tiny traces of larger doses taken much 
earlier. Since there is no way of estimating the size of dose from the size of trace, unless there is 
supplementary information available, the strict liability approach is the only way to catch 
offenders. 
 
A similar problem arises in the case of comparisons of minute quantities with similarly minute 
quantities that are within the range of the naturally occurring. A study at Aberdeen University 
suggested that a combination of food supplements and strenuous exercise could produce levels of 
nandrolone above the acceptable, even up to 20 nanograms-per-millilitre, whilst 5 nanograms-
per-millilitre would indicate a positive test.  
 
When margins are so small, and the consequences of a positive test so significant, we ought to be 
very careful before announcing guilt. Remember, we are relying absolutely on the accuracy and 
reliability of the testers, the tests themselves and of the procedures used. 
 
5. The substance in the event - blanket testing 
 
In addition to the science of the substances in general, we might also investigate the actual 
performance-enhancing capacity of a particular drug in a particular event. Graham Bell, the 
performance director for British skiing said, 
  
“A drug like methamphetamine would not help an alpine skier. At the end of the day it’s 
about skill and staying on your feet, and there’s not a pill that’s been invented that could 
make you ski better.”  (Bell, 2004) 
 
Now, Bell might be right or wrong about this - but it does raise the question of ‘blanket testing’ 
(testing everyone for everything). If a substance is considered not to be performance-enhancing 
in a particular event, to insist on tests and sanctions in that event suggests that another rationale 
for testing is in fact operative, and not the principle of fairness preservation. I can think of three 
possibilities: 
 
(i) that the testing procedures are such as they are in order to fit the convenience of the testers 
(it’s presumably easier for them to apply one set of rules for everyone) 
(ii) that such a practice is considered in some sense fair to all athletes 
(iii) that there is some moral rationale operating, in addition to fairness preservation - for 
example the assertion of the social responsibility of the athlete as role model. 
 
But these are never the overt rationale used by testing authorities, who rely for their legitimacy 
on anti-performance enhancement, based on the fairness preservation rationale. 
 
Outcome 
 
No-one thinks that Alain Baxter tried to cheat, nor that he knowingly took a banned substance, 
nor that he gained any advantage on the day (apart from the restorative benefit of the medicine). 
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Although he was not guilty of those things he still lost his bronze medal, but he was banned from 
competition for only 3 months by the skiing federation (the FIS), presumably in view of the 
many mitigating factors in the case (Cairns, 2002, p. 122). The psychological effect of the 
accusations and procedures on the athlete, however, is impossible to calculate (see Hart 2004). 
 
 
DWAIN CHAMBERS 
 
The Case 
 
Dwain Chambers, a British track athlete and European 100 metres champion, tested positive for 
Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG), a form of anabolic steroid banned under the IAAF doping 
regulations, during an out-of-competition test at his German training base on 1st August 2003.  
Chambers did not deny that the drug was present in his urine sample, but denied knowingly 
taking a banned substance.  Instead, he blamed his Georgian coach Remi Korchemny and his 
nutritionist Victor Conte of Balco Laboratories, Los Angeles, who he says were responsible for 
his nutritional and supplemental regimes (see Hart, 2003). 
 
Principles 
 
1.  Strict liability again. 
 
Chambers protests his innocence - but then he would do so whether innocent or guilty, for he has 
his family, his friends and the outside world to face. However, protestations of innocence are 
useless against the strict liability provision. Sebastian Coe (2003) writes: 
 
Chambers’ mitigating plea is likely to be one of ignorance. It will not cut much ice. The 
genesis of his difficulties may well lie in the hands of a Georgian emigre, now a resident 
of the United States, but the responsibility for what he has consumed, even unwittingly, I 
am afraid, lies fairly and squarely with the sprinter. 
For the International Association of Athletics Federations or UK Athletics to depart one 
millimetre from the legal concept of strict liability is to drive a coach and horses through 
the last few years of hard pounding in the war against drugs. 
 
2.  Secrecy and Intent 
 
Don Catlin, a molecular pharmacologist and director of the Olympic Analytical Laboratory at the 
University of California at Los Angeles, who led the effort to isolate and analyze THG, says that 
scientists familiar with androgenic steroids and their illicit use in athletics were not at all 
surprised by the discovery of THG. He says, 
 
We’ve known about designer steroids for many years, but up to now we’ve never been 
able to prove that someone is actually making them … 
The fact that we finally characterized one is certainly no reason to celebrate. I’m much 
more worried about the next THG out there that we haven’t found yet.  (Ashley, 2004 - 
and for a detailed account of the process, see Longman and Drape, 2003) 
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The idea of the ‘designer steroid’ clearly indicates that there do exist people at a high level in the 
supply chain whose whole intent is to provide substances for performance-enhancement which 
will evade the current regulations or the means of enforcing them. Such secretive evasion of a 
rule may be thought to compound an offence, for it indicates a level of forethought and planning. 
If the athlete fully understands that he is consuming such a substance, then he shares fully in the 
intent to deceive which forms the basis of his cheating. 
 
Richard Pound, President of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), speaking after the 
announcement by UK Athletics of Chambers’ punishment, said: 
  
We are pleased that the process has produced this result of a two-year ban, which is in 
compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code for a first offense for the use of steroids. 
This is a particularly important decision because a disciplinary committee has now 
confirmed that THG is, in fact, a banned substance related to a steroid named on the 
Prohibited List. THG is a steroid created specifically to enhance sports performance and 
allow competitors to cheat. A two-year sanction for its use is completely appropriate. 
(http://www.wada-ama.org/en/t1.asp?p=41275&x=1&a=89361) 
 
3.  The Role of the Coach (and other support staff) 
 
David Moorcroft (in Knight, 2003a) said that UK Athletics had included £300,000 in its annual 
budget since 1999 to fight doping cases, and he wanted to see the fight against drugs to be taken 
beyond the athlete. He said, 
 
The rule of strict liability means the athlete is responsible for what is in their body but I 
would like to work with the IAAF and the World Anti-Doping Agency to try and unravel 
why these things happen. 
 
I’ve felt for a long time that behind every positive case are people around the athlete. The 
sport needs to figure a way that we could either investigate the coaches and agents or 
make strict liability apply to the support team around an athlete. 
 
This raises questions of responsibility in two senses. Firstly, if coaches, doctors or managers are 
actually responsible for suggesting, supplying or prescribing dope or supplements to their 
athletes, then surely they, too, should be held responsible for any offences against the rules of the 
sport. Secondly, if they are to be seen in a supervisory or management relation with their 
athletes, then they should take some responsibility for advising and protecting the athlete. 
 
Chambers was managed by John Regis, the former European 200m champion, who heads the 
athletics division of the Stellar Agency. Regis admitted (in Knight, 2003a) that, despite his role 
in looking after Chambers’ career, the athlete had been “largely unprotected”. However, there are 
small signs of change. Istvan Gyulai, the IAAF general secretary said: 
 
“There is a clear intention within the IAAF to look behind the scenes and there is a 
growing conviction that it is not just the athlete who carries the blame. We already have 
a rule which empowers the ruling council to take action against any person - a coach, 
agent, doctor or manager - who helps with doping. It’s never happened before but it can 
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be at the discretion of the council and involve a ban for a year, two years or for life.” (in 
Knight, 2003c) 
 
4.  Safety 
 
Some substances have been developed so rapidly and recently that there cannot have been time 
for the usual trials conducted on substances intended for use on humans. 
 
Dr Olivier Rabin, the science director of the World Anti-Doping Agency, is reported as warning 
that Chambers could suffer effects beyond the two-year ban imposed, since taking THG has 
possibly put his long-term health at risk. 
 
A new drug can cause toxic damage to the liver, kidneys, brain and blood. That’s why 
drugs go through extensive tests and have to be approved by an ethical committee. 
(Knight, 2004) 
 
To me it’s insane. This went from the test tube to the athlete. There is a huge risk. Who 
knows what will happen in the future? It is extremely scary that this substance never had 
any testing on animals before being given to elite athletes, who have in effect acted as 
guinea pigs. (Mackay, 2004b) 
 
 
5.  Retrospective testing  
 
With the invention of a new test for THG, some authorities have been keen to re-test athletes 
whose collected test samples have been retained by the testing authority. For example, in the 
United States re-tested samples from the national athletics championships in June 2003 revealed 
four THG ‘positives’. 
 
It has been suggested that this is unfair, on three grounds: firstly, simply that it is retrospective, 
secondly that it puts the athlete in ‘double jeopardy’, and thirdly that there is no precedent. 
 
(i)  The first argument goes as follows: retrospective legislation is widely regarded as 
unsatisfactory, since citizens cannot be expected to act in accordance with law that has yet to be 
written. We act on the law as it as, and we should be judged accordingly. Applying new law 
retrospectively is unfair. So, similarly, it is unfair to re-test retrospectively, hunting for new 
substances only recently discovered. 
 
This argument does not hold even in the case of legislation in general. Murder is against the law, 
now and in the past. The invention of DNA profiling permits us to identify past murderers with 
new methods, and there is no unfairness in that. Similarly, steroid doping is against the rules, 
now and in the past. The invention of testing for the steroid THG permits us to identify past 
dopers with new methods, and there is no unfairness in that. Retrospective testing is not 
retrospective legislation. 
 
(ii)  The second argument notes that the principle of double jeopardy states that a person cannot 
be tried twice for the same offence, nor be convicted of different crimes arising from the same 
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conduct. Because of this, some have seen re-testing as problematic, since it puts the athlete twice 
in jeopardy:  
 
At the heart of the legal debate is whether samples that have been previously given the 
all-clear can then be subjected to a second analysis, a process that would go against the 
principle of  ‘double jeopardy’ that is enshrined in British law. 
“The issue with retrospective testing is whether we have got the right to test a negative 
sample a second time,” said a UK Sport spokesman. (Knight, 2003c) 
 
However re-testing is not re-trying. Re-testing is about detection, so as to bring someone to 
‘trial’ for the first time. Double testing is not double jeopardy. 
 
An important side-issue to note here is that one of the chief exceptions to the principle of double 
jeopardy is in respect of the professions. If a member of a profession (such as athletics) commits 
a crime and in so doing also infringes the disciplinary code of his profession, he may be liable to 
be dealt with under that code as well as by the law. So an athlete considering using a Class A 
drug does indeed face double trouble.  
 
(iii)  The third argument notes the lack of precedent, and lack of an agreed policy across sports 
and across countries. Knight (2003c) says: 
 
The legal debate is further complicated by the fact that UK Sport carry out drug tests 
across 41 sports, each of which has its own set of rules. They are consulting with 
administrators from all the affected sports to establish a common policy, though the fact 
that there is currently no provision for re-testing samples in any of the sports’ regulations 
has only added to the headache. 
 
In addition, there is confusion at the international level. Some governing bodies have ordered the 
immediate re-testing of stored urine samples (for example in athletics and swimming, where 
samples collected at the sports’ respective world championships in Paris and Barcelona were sent 
for a second analysis). However, FIFA, the world governing body of football, decided not to re-
test samples on legal advice. So it does seem as though we stand in need of adequate codification 
of the rules, and their consistent application. 
 
6.  Individual and team guilt 
 
It is one thing to face the consequence of one’s own folly or misfortune, and quite another to 
visit it upon others. Where a guilty individual takes part in a team sport, the effect on other 
competitors has to be considered.  
 
A ban for Chambers will mean he and his team-mates, Darren Campbell, Marlon 
Devonish and Christian Malcolm, being stripped of their silver medal from the World 
Championships 4 x 100m.  Knight (2003c) 
 
This was indeed the outcome, but our immediate response is to ask why they should suffer, too, 
when they are guilty of nothing, not even of knowledge of Chambers’ doping. Presumably one 
argument is that, even though they were innocent, they cannot be allowed to benefit from his 
cheating. 
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Some people think that this principle extends from 1 in 4 to 1 in 11. When Rio Ferdinand was 
still playing for Manchester United, whilst waiting for the hearing of his case regarding his 
missed dope test, Sepp Blatter (President of FIFA, the world federation of football) suggested 
that Ferdinand should not be playing club football. He said: “I thought he was suspended. You 
would have to nullify all the matches he has played.” (Davies C, 2003) 
 
On precisely this point, however, UEFA (the European governing body) did not act. Recently, 
Wales lost to Russia in a two-leg play-off for a place in the Euro 2004 finals in Portugal, but the 
Russian Yegor Titov failed a drug test after the first leg in Moscow, and the Welsh FA submitted 
a written complaint to UEFA, asking for the result to be overturned so that Wales could take 
Russia’s place at the finals. UEFA declined to nullify the result, and Russia went to Portugal, 
minus Titov.  
 
So we seem to be left with no clear directive here, although I will return to this theme in the next 
section. Meanwhile, let us conclude by noting that at least one member of the Welsh team, 
Robbie Savage, thought that UEFA’s decision was fair enough. He said: 
 
“Over the two legs they beat us fair and square and they deserved to go through to the 
finals … it’s the biggest disappointment I have ever had in my career.” 
         (Hytner, 2004) 
 
Outcome 
 
Chambers received a two-year ban, and it is doubtful whether he will return to athletics. His 
case, however, raises issues that sports authorities have not yet been able to resolve satisfactorily. 
 
 
RIO FERDINAND 
 
The Case 
 
Rio Ferdinand was found guilty by a Football Association tribunal of failing or refusing to 
provide a sample for UK Sport anti-doping officials on 29 September 2003 at Manchester United 
FC’s Carrington training ground. After being informed that he was to be tested, he says that he 
forgot, left the ground and went shopping. The testing period was two hours, according to the 
officials, and Ferdinand rang after an hour and a half to say that he had forgotten about the test, 
but was now available. The testers decided that there was insufficient time for him to attend, and 
he was deemed to have missed the test. 
 
On 19 December he was banned for 8 months from all competitions, including England’s Euro 
2004 campaign, and fined £50,000 (see Kelso, 2003). 
 
Principles 
 
1.  Failure to attend 
 
16 
As with breathalyser or blood testing for alcohol in the motoring context, a dope test refusal in 
sport carries a presumption of guilt. In addition, a failure to attend or to make oneself available 
for testing is often counted as a refusal. 
 
In principle, it might seem harsh to punish Ferdinand when no doping offence has been proven, 
and when there is good reason to suppose either that he committed no offence or that his offence 
did not confer a performance advantage (and I shall discuss both possibilities in due course). 
However, we can see the reason why a refusal should be treated so seriously, for it denies the 
authorities a legitimate opportunity to secure evidence of the offence. Similarly, we can see the 
reason why test evasion should be treated as seriously as refusal, especially when conditions of 
testing are laid out in advance, and why a failure to attend should be treated as an evasion unless 
exceptional and attested reasons are provided. 
 
In Rio’s case there seem to be a number of possibilities: 
 
(i)  He forgot. It just slipped his mind. 
 
This was Rio’s defence, but it simply beggars belief. If true, it would have been an astounding 
lapse in player responsibility. How could a senior professional footballer have failed to notice the 
importance and seriousness of the occasion, to the extent of leaving the ground with his driver, 
and going shopping? 
 
In any case, it is surely an astounding lapse in supervision of the player. Presumably, this is the 
responsibility of UK Sport’s anti-doping officials (although there is an issue here of whether or 
not Manchester United’s own officials permitted the UK Sport people adequate access to the 
ground and to players). But Manchester United’s officials were also responsible for an 
astounding lapse in protection of their player, of their investment of £30 million in Rio, and of 
their club’s season, which nose-dived when Rio was suspended. 
 
If (i), then both he and the club deserve his fate, for their incompetence and unprofessionalism in 
not realizing the seriousness of the situation, the requirements upon them to act, and the probable 
outcome of non-compliance. 
 
(ii)  He deliberately avoided the test because he did not appreciate the importance of the 
requirement to be tested 
 
It is the responsibility of Football Association, the Professional Footballers’ Association (which 
is the players’ trade union), UK Sport and MUFC both to educate players as to the requirements 
and the likely punishments, and to conduct the testing in an idiot-proof fashion. It seems that 
they all failed in some respect. 
 
Professional players also need to adopt professional attitudes, though. There is a possibility here 
that a high-ranking player behaved in a casual or even arrogant manner, believing either that he 
was so important as to be above the law, or that the punishments were unlikely to be severe. 
 
In mitigation, however, there was no consistent FA policy to rely on (see examples later), there 
was evidence of leniency in prior cases, and apparently no player support facility available 
anywhere - at the FA, the PFA or MUFC. 
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(iii)  He deliberately avoided the test because he believed that the test would reveal something in 
his system that he wanted to conceal 
 
To test this suggestion, we must consider the nature of the hypothetical ‘something’ … 
 
(a)  a banned substance?  Here we are reliant on the science of the situation.  Rio apparently 
tried to be tested that day, but the testers had left, so he was tested two days later, when he tested 
negative. Is there a substance such that a 48 hour delay would make a difference in detection? If 
not, it looks as though Rio was innocent of taking a performance-enhancing substance. However, 
not all banned substances are performance-enhancing. 
 
(b)  a recreational drug?  Again: is there a substance such that 48 hours would make a 
difference? If so, a suspicion might arise that the reason for test avoidance could have been to 
conceal use of a recreational drug. Now we have to raise the question: what should drug tests test 
for? Of course, UK Sport will test for everything on the banned list, but this undermines the 
primary rationale that testing is for fairness preservation, and the denial of unfair advantage. 
 
On this occasion, we had a ‘blanket’ test, and MUFC seem to have had the right to see the 
results, which immediately introduces other rationales, such as the social responsibility (‘role 
model’) rationale and the ‘lifestyle’ rationale. 
 
If a recreational drug were involved, and the player sought to avoid detection by postponing the 
test until 48 hours later, this seems a small enough offence. If it had been possible to see this as 
simply an internal disciplinary matter, it could have been settled between player and club. As it 
is, a lack of clarity, combined with the intrusiveness of anti-doping rules, might have been 
factors in the more serious procedural offence having been committed (failure to take the test). 
 
(c)  the presence of a medical condition or a prescribed medicine? Medical matters immediately 
raise issues of privacy, and Rio reportedly rang his medical centre from his mobile phone before 
going shopping.  There might have been many reasons for this, but one possibility, presumably, 
is for medical advice on what might be revealed by the test. After having been reassured, it 
would then be possible for him to offer to take the test after all. 
 
Alternatively, it would have been useful if he could have negotiated, on a basis similar to 
medical confidentiality, that any non-relevant substance should not be revealed to MUFC or 
anyone else. But it is very unclear how a player might go about such a negotiation, and it is not 
clear that anyone advises or reassures players on matters such as these. We might ask whether 
there is a code of practice, a hotline, or a support service available for players, or someone to 
turn to. 
 
If Rio was seeking to preserve privacy on a medical matter, I think most people would feel 
sympathy on at least privacy grounds. It is unfortunate that there was no clear and agreed prior 
procedure for dealing with such issues, which had been adequately communicated to players. 
 
2.  Performance-enhancing and ‘Recreational’ Drugs 
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Discussion of drugs in sport takes place in a context of social concern regarding the use of 
‘recreational drugs’ in the general population, but the source of concern is different in each case. 
We must distinguish the fairness preservation rationale against drugs in sport from the various 
rationales put forward against recreational drugs, and we must not confuse performance-
enhancement and recreational uses of drugs by sportspeople. 
 
But this is just what UK Sport did, in testing for all substances. It is almost as if they were acting 
as agent for the club management’s overseeing of the player’s lifestyle. This seems to me to 
over-aggrandise the anti-doping agency’s role and remit. It certainly extends it well beyond the 
performance-enhancement rationale that gives it unquestioned authority and such wide-ranging 
powers.  Such unwarranted intrusion into players’ private lives prejudices its fragile legitimacy, 
which is based on an acceptance of its independent pursuit of fairness preservation. 
 
This point was not widely recognized in the discussion until the Mutu case. Adrian Mutu, the 
Romanian striker playing for Chelsea, tested positive for cocaine in October 2004 and was 
sacked by his club. Although there seems to be some unfairness here, since drug testing in the 
workplace is generally seen as contrary to human rights provisions unless health and safety is an 
issue, the sports doping regulations permit little opportunity for sports employers to make the 
distinction between performance-enhancing and recreational drugs, since both are on the banned 
list (see Kelso, 2004).   
 
Thompson (1982, p. 315) says: “We would not tolerate urinalysis … as a condition of 
employment in a bank or a factory.” So why do we tolerate it in sport? It must be justified in 
sport only because of the contract to contest - the pre-contest agreement between athletes to 
compete without performance-enhancement by drugs. 
 
However, there is a different rationale under which highly paid professional athletes might 
reasonably consent to operate.  Although such close attention by employers to one’s private life 
would not be tolerated in most spheres of life, there is something different about a very highly 
rewarded public figure who has signed a particular form of contract.  Some contracts even 
include prescriptions against alcohol and late nights, and most players believe that the reward is 
worth the discipline. 
 
Finally, there is the ‘role model’ argument - that players should set a good example, and the 
‘practice preservation’ argument - that players should not bring the game into disrepute. 
However, both of these would be more persuasive 
 
… if clubs and regulators took a similarly firm stance over the regular abuse of alcohol, 
on-field aggression, open disrespect for authority, and allegations of sexual aggression, 
that have become a feature of the game. (Kelso, 2004) 
 
3.  Suspension Pending Enquiry or Appeal 
 
After his failure to attend for testing, Rio continued to play for his team.  However, in other 
professions, the accused is not allowed to continue activity whilst under enquiry relating to 
conduct, or appeal. There are two competing principles at work here: one says that the individual 
is innocent until proven guilty; the other says that he should be suspended pending the outcome. 
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The first protects the rights of the individual, whilst the second protects the integrity of the 
practice, in this case, football. We should ask what happens if Rio is guilty, and Manchester 
United have won games with him playing? It seems excessive to render all the results null and 
void - but it seems weak to allow them all to stand. 
 
One suggestion is that we should assess the extent to which the player contributed to the result. 
He might be thought to have been just one of eleven, playing the kind of role in the victory that 
one of the substitutes might well have done - in which case there does not seem to be much of a 
case for overturning the result. On the other hand, if the player had scored the winning goal, or 
had scored three, he might be thought to have been the deciding factor. (The discussion of 
individual and team guilt in the Dwain Chambers case refers here.) In Rio’s case, he seems to 
have been an important factor in his team’s defensive performance, and so we must ask what has 
been his likely effect on the teams he played against whilst under enquiry and appeal. What if, 
for example, he contributed significantly to the defeat of a team that was subsequently relegated, 
or knocked out of a competition? 
 
It is difficult to see how we can deal with such matters on a case-by-case basis, because such a 
procedure presents enormous difficulties of calculation and comparison and raises the spectre of 
injustice across cases. A clearer resolution, and one that respects football, would be to insist upon 
suspension after a failed or missed drugs test, followed if necessary by a swift enquiry or appeal. 
 
That is to say, Rio should not have been playing in those games at all. 
 
4.  Clarity and Consistency of Testing Procedures, Protocols and Penalties 
 
The Football Association admitted that they had been caught out by Rio Ferdinand’s drugs case. 
David Davies, the FA’s executive director, said of their testing procedure: “It is apparent to some 
of us it was not introduced with people who wouldn’t turn up in mind. We didn’t envisage 
someone failing to take a test” (Davies C, 2003). Neither had the FA paid sufficient attention to 
the timescale and efficiency of their procedures (for one thing, the appeal procedure was long 
and cumbersome), to rule clarity, transparency of process, and awareness of their rules, protocols 
and penalties. 
 
We can ask questions, too, about the management of the actual testing event itself. Ferdinand 
was deemed to have missed the test, even though he called the testers within 90 minutes of his 
appointed time. Who was it who decided that two hours was the limit, that 30 minutes was 
insufficient time for Rio to attend, and that there was to be no discretion on the matter? 
Doubtless they are very busy people, but why could the testers not have waited a few more 
minutes for Rio to arrive, given the gravity of a failure to attend?  FA General Secretary Graham 
Kelly reports that the FA only later drew up ‘revised procedures to include this two-hour 
stipulation’. 
 
Next, we can point to many inconsistencies in treatment of individuals. In 2002 FIFA allowed 
the FA let off Billy Turley, who had tested positive for nandrolone. Edgar Davids and Jaap Stam 
were both banned by UEFA for 5 months for testing positive for nandrolone, whilst Rio got 8 
months for a failure/refusal followed shortly by a negative test. 
 
20 
The harsher treatment of Rio may be related to the aim of making an example of a high-profile 
player – of setting the standard for future cases. Two members of the three-man tribunal which 
convicted Ferdinand sat in a case involving the little-known Manchester City player Christian 
Ngouai, who committed the same offence earlier in the year, and who received only a £2,000 
fine. Ngouai, also, was allowed an hour’s grace to complete the test. 
 
Even the UEFA guidelines currently suggested a minimum six month ban for a first offence, but 
at the time FIFA was in discussions with WADA. So the harsher treatment may also be related to 
the national and international politics of football. The FA had recently appointed a new chief 
executive who, it could be argued, used the high profile of Ferdinand to set an example for a 
firmer stance on disciplinary issues (McCarra, 2003).  At the same time, the IOC and WADA 
were struggling to persuade governments to contribute their share to the funding of  WADA, and 
to persuade some of the more influential and powerful international sports federations to agree to 
the WADA code, so as fully to internationalise its provisions and to render clear its guidelines 
and coherent its punishments. FIFA president Sepp Blatter’s calls for a greater punishment for 
Rio attest to the growing rapprochement of FIFA with WADA, since FIFA was a notable non-
signatory to the WADA code. Blatter was working with Dick Pound, chair of WADA, towards 
an agreement whose importance to them both can be assessed by the fact that it was announced 
at a special ceremony at the FIFA Centennial Congress in Paris in May 2004. At that time, IOC 
president Jacques Rogge praised Blatter for FIFA’s compliance. He said: “The agreement with 
WADA sends a strong signal to other international sports organisations and national 
governments.” 
 
Finally, we should record the many inconsistencies in rules and their application across sports. 
The IAAF controls athletics, and issues a two-year ban for a first drugs offence, and a life ban for 
a second. All of the footballers discussed would have been banned for two years if they had been 
athletes. It could be said that such inconsistencies are a direct result of the powerful professional 
federations of football, tennis and cycling protecting their valuable assets, their professional 
athletes, and calculating their financial losses over an extended ban.  In addition, their athletes 
are willing and able to defend themselves in the courts, so the federations fear bankruptcy if 
successfully sued by their own athletes. 
 
The athletes have a right to know what to expect from the disciplinary process (see Hansen, 
2003). On the evidence of prior cases, Rio had every right to conclude that any punishment 
would be nugatory. If he (or anyone advising him) had reason to believe that an 8-month ban was 
even a remote possibility, the whole event might have been differently managed. 
 
5.  Player Protection - The Role and Responsibilities of the Club and Others 
 
Rio Ferdinand should have been better advised and protected by those around him. Sebastian 
Coe said: 
 
But how could a club with their wealth and resources allow this situation to develop? 
Once the truth emerged, they were outraged that they couldn’t shut up shop. But this was 
not just an impertinent question from a journalist that could be slapped away. Beyond 
missing his test, I don’t necessarily think Rio was guilty of anything more than being 
involved with a club who could not see the importance of this issue.  Manchester United 
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… implied that random testing is some sort of personal intrusion. They’re living in la-la 
land. (McRae, 2004) 
 
WADA was set up in 1999 to develop international co-operation in the fight against doping. It is 
now backed not only by the IOC, but also by more than 70 governments, and most of the 
International Sports Federations. It wants a two-year ban for a first drugs offence, and a life ban 
for a second, as in athletics, and a strict liability policy. Why did those in charge of football in 
England, and those whose well-paid responsibility it was to protect the player and the club’s 
asset, not see this coming? 
 
Outcome 
 
Since Rio is palpably innocent of taking any performance-enhancing substance, and the 
temporary amnesia argument is unconvincing, a not unreasonable supposition is that he 
deliberately evaded the test because he wished to avoid detection of some non-performance-
enhancing substance in his system. The irony is that it is not clear why such a substance should 
be any of the business of UK Sport, the FA, or his club. 
 
He has been punished because failure to attend = test refusal = presumption of guilt of using a 
performance-enhancing drug. Although we can be pretty sure that he was innocent of that, 
because of the subsequent negative test, nevertheless the UK Sport anti-doping system ground 
out its result. If he was merely seeking to avoid the club’s disciplinary procedures for the use of a 
social drug, or to preserve his privacy over a medical matter, he nevertheless ran foul of the 
performance-enhancing drug detection machinery. 
 
As it is, the consequences were very serious indeed. Not only did a player in his prime - some 
think the best defender at the 2002 World Cup - spend many months in enforced idleness, but 
also his club suffered badly. A few weeks after his ban, Manchester United had the worst 
defensive record in the Premier League, dropped 12 points behind the leaders, and eventually 
lost their champions title. And although his country put up a fair performance at the Euro 2004 
championship we can’t really estimate the consequences of his absence. 
 
Rio is now back playing for club and country, the FA has improved its procedures, and FIFA has 
signed up to WADA. But it is hard to believe see how the FA, the PFA, MUFC and Rio’s agent 
and advisers come out of this with any credit at all. 
 
 
GREG RUSEDSKI 
 
The Case 
 
In 2002, the Czech tennis player Bohdan Ulihrach was found to have taken the steroid 
nandrolone and was banned for two years by the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP).  
However, other players who gave samples at around the same time also showed elevated 
nandrolone levels and an enquiry by an IOC-accredited laboratory in Montreal revealed that all 
these cases had a ‘common analytical fingerprint’ – i.e. were likely to have come from the same 
ingredients. These ingredients were mineral supplements and electrolytes that had been provided 
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by the ATP trainers to players on the ATP tour. Ulihrach’s sentence was quashed, and charges 
were dropped against six other unnamed players. 
 
On July 23rd the British tennis number two, Greg Rusedski, tested positive for the steroid 
nandrolone on the ATP tour in Indianapolis.  His was one of 47 positive samples from the top 
120 players, all of which demonstrated the ‘common analytical fingerprint’, such as was 
unknown in any other sport, thus indicating a single source from within tennis. 43 cases were not 
investigated further. However, Rusedski’s sample was one of four taken two months after the 
trainers had been instructed to desist, and so the ATP moved to prosecution. Rusedski announced 
his involvement publicly, denied any wrong-doing and declared his intention to defend himself. 
 
1.  Strict liability 
 
If the principle of strict liability were to hold, the question arises as to why the ATP saw fit to 
quash Ulihrach’s sentence and to drop charges against others. Many athletes, including Alain 
Baxter, as we have seen, have been able to tell a story which might have provided a good excuse 
for the existence of banned substances in their bodies - and yet they have still received 
punishments, presumably on the ground that any relaxation of the principle would open the 
flood-gates to imaginative athletes and clever lawyers. 
 
The first point to notice, then, is that in the case of Ulihrach and others the ATP breached the 
principle of strict liability. 
 
2.  Acknowledgement of a wider authority 
 
The ATP would not have been able to do this if it had been willing to acknowledge a wider 
authority in doping matters. Here it is useful to ask what reason there is for more than one 
governing body in world tennis, over and above the obvious economic reasons. For the origins of 
this scandal lie not only in the incompetence of the ATP, but also in an arrogant isolationism, 
which presumably preserves its power over the game. The ATP were all at once: provider of the 
banned substance, provider of the agents who supplied the substance to the athletes, employer of 
the athletes, policeman, judge and jury. 
 
Without outside checks or referral to any authority other than itself there is a rich context here 
for confusion and injustice. Some of this could surely have been avoided if there were a unified 
world administration for tennis, and if tennis had signed up to the provisions of WADA. The 
ATP could even have taken the issue to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne in 2002, 
instead of trying to deal with it ‘in-house’. It didn’t do so, and thus the Rusedski case was an 
accident waiting to happen.  This raises serious questions about the governance of tennis at the 
highest level. 
 
Parsons (2003) reports that the International Tennis Federation, who deal with offences 
involving Grand Slam tournaments and Davis Cup matches, were furious at the ATP because 
their high-handed approach was bound to suggest that tennis does not take drug-testing as 
seriously as other sporting bodies, whereas top professionals (e.g. Agassi, in Parsons 2004 and 
Shine 2004) argue that tennis is among the best-policed sports. 
 
3.  Equitable estoppel 
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The ATP presumably realised that it had placed itself in an impossible position, having accepted 
that it had provided the contaminated supplements in the first place, and that at least the majority 
of its athletes who tested positive were not guilty of any intentional wrong-doing. Of course, this 
alone would not have been a defence against the strict liability rule, but Ulihrach’s ban was 
overturned in July 2003 on the grounds of ‘equitable estoppal’, the legal principle that says that a 
person cannot be prosecuted for an offence that is shown to be the fault of the prosecuting 
authority (see Hart 2004). Now we can see the importance of reference to authorities other than 
oneself, for the defence of equitable estoppal was available to the player only because the ATP 
was both an agent in the offence and the prosecutor. This is a direct result of tennis not signing 
up to WADA, and being policed by itself. Rusedski, too, relied upon this defence. 
 
4.  Reliance on science (of nandrolone in the body, and of quantities) 
 
It is difficult to see how we can have good law if it is based on flawed or inadequate science. 
And, of course, less than reliable science also brings dope testing, and sport itself, into disrepute. 
 
Dr Wheeler, from St Thomas’ Hospital, London, is quoted as saying that there is evidence that 
after a competitive event or hard training, nandrolone levels go up above the limit.  Nandrolone 
can also easily enter the body through contaminated hydrating substances or through 
contaminated meat; and legal dietary supplements are broken down by the body to produce the 
same substances created when nandrolone is broken down in the body.  Also, nandrolone traces 
can persist within the body for up to 12 months.  Finally, Wheeler states that ‘the nandrolone 
research that was carried out was on a few individuals who were not athletes.’ (1999) 
 
One ruling in 1999 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne supports these misgivings 
and said that, despite the WADA ruling that 4 nanograms of nandrolone per millilitre of urine, 2 
to 5 nanograms was a ‘grey area’, and that such a level ‘could be the result of endogenous 
production of the human body.’ (see Goodbody 2004, p. 42). Such findings suggest that too strict 
an application of the rules might well result in injustice, and to avoid it we need to be as sure as 
we can be that we can rely on the science behind the rules. 
 
5.  Supplements 
 
Since Rusedski’s case rests on allegations of contaminated supplements, it raises the general 
issue of supplements. Richard Quick, a swimming coach who thinks of himself as someone “on 
the cutting edge of what can be done nutritionally and with supplements” is quoted as claiming 
that his athletes can do “steroid-like performances”, trying to “keep up with the people who are 
cheating without cheating”.  (Sokolove, 2004, p. 53) 
 
And there are other ‘artificial’ means of enhancing performance, such as the altitude chamber 
which, whilst not illegal, severely test our intuitions as to what should be permissible.  
 
A whole team of long-distance runners sponsored by Nike lives in a much more elaborate 
simulated high-altitude dwelling in Portand, Oregon.  (Sokolove, 2004, p. 53) 
 
So comprehensive and elaborate are the plans for nutrition, supplementation, enhancement and 
doping that, from the point of view of the athlete, it can be difficult to see where one begins and 
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the other ends. There has also been some official confusion over the relative seriousness of a 
particular drug, for example in cases involving modafinil. When Kelli White, who was a training 
partner of Dwain Chambers, tested positive at the World Championships, the International 
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) classified modafinil as a mild stimulant. 
 
The classification meant White faced disqualification and losing her 100 and 200m gold 
medals - but no ban. The new WADA list of prohibited substances, published on Jan 1, 
however, includes modafinil as a major stimulant. (Knight, 2004) 
 
So was she taking a mild or a major stimulant? Did she take it or was she given it to take? Did 
she really appreciate what she was doing and what the consequences might be? 
 
Kelli White … lost her medals and prize money after a drug test showed that she had 
taken the stimulant modafinil.  “After a competition”, she said, “it’s hard to remember 
everything that you take during the day.” (Sokolove, 2004, p. 52) 
 
How revealing – this suggests a regime designed by a team of support staff, to which the athlete 
submits. Even ‘clean’ athletes take a cocktail of pills that they hope will compensate for the 
supposed advantages of the banned substances taken by the cheats who risk detection. Greg 
Rusedski took such a cocktail every day, with a detailed and systematic diary – and we should 
assume that this is the rule rather than the exception amongst elite athletes, many of whom tread 
a fine line between the legal and the illegal. 
 
6.  The Effect on the Logic of a Competition 
 
As with Rio, Greg Rusedski was free to continue playing competitive tennis until his tribunal, 
held eight months after his positive test. We have contradictory intuitions and traditions 
operating here. On the one hand, he’s ‘innocent until found guilty’, and should not be penalized 
in advance of the tribunal. On the other hand, a serious charge often brings an immediate 
suspension from duty pending investigations.  For, if guilty, he would have been allowed to play 
as a cheat. 
 
In the Baxter case, his Olympic bronze medal had to be returned, and the next best competitor 
was elevated - but what can the organizers of a tennis tournament do if a cheat wins a 
tournament? In like fashion, the cheat’s result could be expunged, and other players advanced in 
the rankings. But, in this case, not only would he have won the contest; but also he would have 
beaten players in earlier rounds who were then knocked out, so that they could not make their 
mark in further rounds. Someone might reasonably claim, as the England football team regularly 
does in the World Cup after meeting Brazil, “If he hadn’t beaten me in an earlier round, I might 
well have gone on to win.” To expunge not only his tournament win, but all of his results, would 
make a nonsense of the whole tournament.  
 
Outcome 
 
Rusedski was found not guilty at tribunal, and left without a stain on his character. Doubtless he 
will continue to keep a check on the supplements he takes, and will get them regularly tested for 
himself. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Sometimes, we want the law to be clear-cut and evenly applied, but what we have seen through a 
consideration of these cases is that there is often genuine complexity and difficulty in the context 
and in the detail of the particular case. Outcomes are often determined not just by the rule, but 
also in the interpretation and application of the rule, which requires reference to background 
moral principles. In turn, those principles can only themselves be applied with reference to 
empirical features of the case, and also to facts of the matter. Mitigation, too, is almost wholly 
determined by context and by the features of the particular case. 
 
What we learn from this is that justice does not run on rails. There is no simple reading-off of the 
correct disposal of the case from the rules governing it. Rather, it is a matter of thoughtful 
judgement, the weighing of all the elements present, and the bringing to bear of wider moral 
principles. We also learn that, if we carefully consider a range of cases, we can test both them 
and ourselves for consistency of approach and consistency in application of principle, and 
thereby extend our capacity for thinking through cases and arriving at just disposals. 
 
We need to be constantly vigilant that consistency across cases is preserved. In order to achieve 
this, we should be on the lookout for any more general outcomes that might be applied across 
cases, and asking whether any more systematic view is achievable. 
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